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pAbstract: It is well-established that Arab labor markets share certain common
characteristics, including an oversized public sector, high youth unemployment, weak
private sectors, rapidly growing but highly distorted educational attainment, and low
and stagnant female labor force participation. I argue in this paper that all of these
features can be explained by the deep and persistent dualism that characterizes Arab
labor markets that resulted from the use of labor markets by Arab regimes as tool of
political appeasement in the context of “authoritarian bargain” social contracts. Even
as fiscal crises have long destabilized these arrangements in most non-oil Arab
countries, culminating in the dramatic political upheavals of the Arab Spring, I argue
that the enduring legacy of dualism will continue to strongly shape the production
and deployment of human capital in Arab economies for some time.
JEL classification: I25, J21, J24, J31, J45, O53, P52
Keywords: Labor market dualism; Arab Spring; Unemployment; Education;
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The stylized facts about the structure and operation of Arab labor markets are fairly
well established. Much of the Arab World is characterized by an oversized public sec-
tor, with employment in the bureaucracy and security forces not only constituting a
large fraction of total employment but also a dominant share of formal sector employ-
ment (cf. Shaban et al. 2001, Said 2001, World Bank 2004a). It is also well-established
that public employment constitutes an important share of employment for politically
significant groups in much of the Arab World, such as the educated middle class, citi-
zens of oil-rich monarchies, and members of key sects, tribes or ethnic groups. The
oversized public sector has generally meant that the formal private sector is typically
anemic and small, relying mostly on government welfare and rent-seeking for its sur-
vival (Malik and Awadallah 2013, World Bank 2013a, ESCWA 2012). A corollary of
this lack of private sector dynamism has been the growth of informality, especially in
situations where the ability of the public sector to continue growing its workforce be-
came increasingly curtailed due to fiscal realities.
Arab economies are also characterized by large, but distorted investments in human
capital. While many Arab countries have experienced some of the most rapid increases
in educational attainment in the world over the past three decades, much of the invest-
ment in human capital has been in pursuit of the credentials useful to access public
sector jobs rather than the skills demanded by globalizing economies (Salehi-IsfahaniAssaad; licensee Springer. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly cited.
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low scores obtained by Arab students in standardized international tests (Muliss et al.
2008). With rapidly increasing educational attainment and falling gender gaps in educa-
tion, one would have expected female labor force participation rates to have risen
sharply, given the strong positive relationship between education and participation.
This has in fact not happened. Overall female participation rates have stagnated, and,
participation rates for educated women have in fact fallen significantly in recent years
as opportunities in the public sector have been curtailed. Finally, the best known styl-
ized fact about Arab labor markets is very high youth unemployment. Youth unemploy-
ment rates in the Arab region, which are the highest across all major world regions, are
clearly associated with the difficulty educated young people have been having in acces-
sing employment for the first time.
The principal argument I advance in this paper is that most of these stylized facts
can be explained by one underlying characteristic of Arab labor markets, and that is
the deep and persistent dualism that has characterized them throughout the post-
independence period. This dualism is primarily driven by the use of public sector em-
ployment by authoritarian regimes as a tool to appease politically salient groups as part
of the “authoritarian bargain” social contracts they have struck with their citizens. In
brief, the authoritarian bargain is a sort of implicit deal between authoritarian regimes
and politically significant groups to provide them with well-compensated jobs in the
bureaucracy and the security forces, among other privileges such as access to subsi-
dized commodities, housing and services, in exchange for political quiescence, if not
loyalty (See Amin et al. 2012; Desai et al. 2009). By using labor markets as means to
distribute rents and to buy political quiescence, Arab governments have essentially
undermined the labor markets’ primary function, which is to efficiently allocate human
capital to its most productive uses and to signal the kind of human capital investments
that are needed.
The politically significant groups that have benefited from the authoritarian bargain
vary from country to country, but include the educated middle classes in many of the
populous countries of the region (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia), all citizens in the
sparsely populated oil-rich gulf monarchies that depend on large numbers of expatriate
workers, and members of important sects, tribes or clans in countries such as Jordan,
Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
Although these authoritarian bargains often placed unsustainable fiscal burdens on
state budgets, they endured in the region as a result of the regimes’ continued access to
hydrocarbon and other mineral rents, either directly or through foreign aid. Ali and
Elbadawi (2012) argue that ruling elites in oil-rich countries attempt to avert revolt by
using labor markets as a mechanism to transfer a fraction of the oil rent to politically
significant groups. This is done primarily through public sector employment, which
tends to be much larger in these countries than comparable developing countries. Their
ability to do this is clearly a function of the size of the oil rent per capita that is at their
disposal (See also Robinson et al. 2006).
With downward pressure on oil prices in the second half of the 1980s and much of
the 1990s, these authoritarian bargain social contracts eventually became fiscally unsus-
tainable and came under severe pressure in a number of countries, especially the more
populous oil producers, which had to increasingly resort to repression to maintain the
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the 2000s, there were clear attempts to re-establish the old bargains, with the greatest
success in doing so in the oil-rich economies of the Gulf and in places like Algeria in
North Africa (Lowi 2009). The regimes without ready access to plentiful mineral rents
were forced to gradually renege on their side of the bargain but, besides resorting to
greater repression, they tried to minimize the political fallout by protecting insiders and
shifting the cost of adjustment to outsiders. Insiders were typically members of the pri-
vileged groups who had already gained access to the benefits of the authoritarian bar-
gain in the form of public sector jobs and other entitlements. An important group of
outsiders, who bore the brunt of the adjustment, were the young people who invested
in the sorts of credentials that would in the past have guaranteed them a place in the
bureaucracy, but now found themselves relegated to low-quality informal jobs. Almost
all entitlement reforms, including the curtailment of public sector employment, have
sought to make the reforms more politically palatable by grandfathering in those who
had already acquired the entitlement. Thus existing government workers were for the
most part able to retain their jobs and their access to subsidized housing and services,
with young newcomers bearing the brunt of the changes (Amin et al. 2012).
While it is hard to formally test the proposition that politically motivated public sec-
tor hiring caused all the labor market outcomes I discuss here, I present a great deal of
circumstantial evidence in favor of it. I do attempt in the last section of the paper a for-
mal test of the proposition that high public sector employment at the governorate or
province level drives young people to queue for government jobs and thus raises youth
unemployment. However, this test has obvious limitations in that it essentially assumes
that young people’s employment prospects and search activities are mostly limited to
their local labor market. This assumption is clearly problematic especially for more ed-
ucated groups who are likely to consider opportunities on a national rather than a re-
gional scale. However, the test does suggest that for less educated youth and even for
educated female youth, who may be more geographically constrained, higher levels of
youth unemployment are in fact associated with higher local rates of government em-
ployment in most of the countries I consider.
In what follows I will first present a simple theoretical model illustrating how public
sector hiring and compensation leads to labor market dualism and unemployment. I
then present further evidence supporting the stylized facts discussed above and end
with an empirical analysis, using census microdata from a number of Arab countries,
which links high youth unemployment to the possibility of getting government jobs.1. Government hiring and compensation practices, labor market dualism and structural
unemployment: a simple model1
The gist of my argument is that the labor market dualism that resulted from the au-
thoritarian bargain and its aftermath continues to drive labor market expectations,
choices regarding what type of human capital to invest in, and the queuing behavior
that leads to excessive unemployment among new entrants. To illustrate this argument,
I will draw on a simple model derived from the classic Harris-Todaro model of migra-
tion and unemployment in a dualistic developing economy (Harris and Todaro 1970).
The model relies on the public sector paying compensations (including non-wage
Figure 1 Supply and Demand of Educated Labor in the Presence of a Public Sector Wage Floor.
Source: Assaad 1997.
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for certain eligible groups. These groups are then induced to queue for the rationed
government jobs, with the extent of queuing being a function of the probability of
obtaining such a job. If eligibility is based on obtaining a minimum threshold of educa-
tion, the persistence of this dualism over a long period of time will not only result in
high unemployment among educated new entrants, but also the systematic misalloca-
tion of human capital to less productive uses in the public sector and to distortions in
the sorts of human capital investments people make. The latter problem has been re-
ferred to as the “credentialist equilibirum”, whereby the lure of public sector employ-
ment leads to investments in the acquisition of the diplomas needed to obtain such
jobs, at the expense of the skills needed in a competitive private sector-led economy
(Salehi-Isfahani 2012).
The simple static supply and demand model of the labor market for graduates eligible
for government jobs, shown in Figure 1 illustrates the gist of the argument. The model
shows the demand curve for labor in the private sector as DP and the demand curve in
both the private and public sectors as DP+G . In a competitive labor market, the market
clearing wage would be W*. However, the government pays a compensation level Wgov
that is higher than the market clearing wage. This induces new entrants to queue for
the rationed government jobs on the basis of an expected wage We, which is equal to
the probability of getting a job in the government times the government wage Wgov
plus the probability of getting a job in the private sector times the market clearing wage
W*. This translates into a labor supply that extends along the parabola E-E from the
intersection of the demand curve DP+G and Wgov to the supply curve S, forming a new
equilibrium wage We. At that wage, labor supply LT1 exceeds labor demand LTe and the
difference shows up as unemployment of graduates.
A couple of things to note about the results of such a model is that the distortion in-
troduced by the government wage being higher than market clearing wage raises the
labor supply of graduates over what it would be otherwise (mostly by inducing more
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duces the quantity of labor demanded in the private sector from LP0 to LP1. Thus, this
simple static model explains a number of the stylized features of Arab labor markets,
namely high unemployment among graduates, strong preference for government jobs
among new entrants and propensity to queue for it, excessive demand for credentials,
and anemic employment growth in the private sector.
It is of course possible that instead of remaining unemployed while queuing or
searching for government jobs, young people enter into informal employment while
continuing to search for government employment. A similar extension to the Harris-
Todaro model was introduced by Fields (1975). While such behavior is possible, it may
not happen right away for all new entrants seeking government jobs, and may not be
an option at all for some youth. Young men for instance may want to remain un-
employment for some time in order to maximize their search effectiveness and because
informal employment may yield lower wages than their initially high reservation wages,
which will eventually adjust downward. Young women seeking government employ-
ment, on the other hand, are likely to remain in the unemployment state longer than
young men because of their poorer informal employment prospects, the reputational
risks that such employment could represent for them, and their even higher reservation
wages.2. An oversized public sector
The first and most obvious consequence of the use of public employment as a
tool for political appeasement is an over-sized public sector. Evidence of an oversized
public sector relative to the size of the economy in most Arab countries is not hard to
come by. Data from the World Bank on a sample of 12 MENA countries, shown in
Figure 2, shows that central government wage and salary expenditures average about
10 percent of GDP, which is higher than in any other world region, including OECD
countries (World Bank, no date). On the basis of a smaller sample of 6 MENA coun-
tries, the same source shows that the share of general government expenditures on
wages and salaries is about 12 percent, similar to the average for OECD countries, but
higher than any other developing world region (Ibid.).Central Government
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Figure 2 Size of Central and General Government Wage Bill Relative to Government Expenditures
and Revenues, and GDP by Region. Source: World Bank (2011) based on IMF data.
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countries are significantly higher than in a sample of comparable developing countries,
and also vary significantly within the region, ranging from 14 percent in Morocco to 40
percent in Jordan. In some cases these figures understate the true size of employment
in government because they exclude employment in the armed forces, as is known to
be the case in Egypt and Syria. The employment shares shown in Figure 3 for Gulf
economies strongly understate the contribution of public sector employment to the
employment of nationals since they include both nationals and expatriate workers. The
share of the public sector in the employment of nationals is as high as 87% in Qatar,
86% in Kuwait and 72% in Saudi Arabia (Baldwin-Edwards 2011). It is in excess of 90%
among UAE nationals (World Bank 2013a).
Evidence on public-private wage differentials in Arab countries is hard to come by.
The comparison is complicated by the fact that the public and private sector work-
forces differ along productive characteristics such as education and experience and that
public sector jobs generally offer superior non-pecuniary aspects of employment, such
as job security, health benefits, paid vacations, sick leave, etc.. Results using 1988 and
1998 data on Egypt showed that there was a positive differential in wages of about 20
percent favoring the private sector male workers when compared to workers with simi-
lar characteristics in the government (Assaad 1997 and Said 2009). The differential for
female workers, on the other hand, clearly favored government workers over private
sector workers (by 60 percent in 1988 and 10 percent in 1998). Using 2006 data, Said
(2009) finds that the differential in favor of the private sector had practically disap-
peared for males and that favoring government workers for females had widened to 33
percent. When comparing public enterprise to private sector wages, wage differential
correcting for education and experience are always in favor of the public sector for
both males and females. Said (2009) estimates that they were as high as 27 percent
for males and 33 percent for females in 2006. Said (2013) provides similar estimates for
Jordan in 2010. She estimates that public sector wages are lower than private sector
wages by about 8 percent for males, but higher by 17 percent for females. Given that
the non-pecuniary aspects of employment are likely to be substantially higher in the
public sector, these public-private wage differentials indicate that total public sectorFigure 3 Employment shares in the public sector (%), averages in the 2000s. Source: World Bank, 2013a.
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characteristics in both Jordan and Egypt2. Although no direct evidence is readily avail-
able, it is likely that compensation differentials in favor of the public sector are even
larger in oil-rich Arab countries where public employment is used as a primary mech-
anism to distribute the oil rent.
Given the significant differential in compensation in favor of the public sector, it is
no wonder that both youth and adults in the MENA region express strong preference
for public sector employment in opinion surveys. When asked whether they prefer em-
ployment in government, private business, self-employment, or employment in non-
profit organization, assuming that pay and work conditions were similar, a majority of
youth and adults interviewed in the Gallup World Poll in most Arab countries select
government employment. As shown in Figure 4, the proportion of youth selecting gov-
ernment employment over the other three options exceeds 50 percent in all countries
except for Lebanon, Sudan, Morocco and Algeria. The first three of these countries
have some of the lowest public employment rates in the region. Preferences for the
public sector tend to be strongest in oil-rich countries, such as UAE, Iraq, and Kuwait,
which have traditional used public employment as mechanism to redistribute oil rents,
but they are also strong in Yemen, Egypt, and Jordan, which have long traditions of em-
ployment graduates in the public sector.3. Large but distorted investments in education
Arab countries have made very significant investments aimed at raising educational at-
tainment and closing the gender gap in education in recent years. As shown in Figure 5,
among the 20 countries with the largest increases in educational attainment from 1980
to 2010, as measured by mean years of schooling, eight were Arab countries and the












Figure 4 Proportion of Youth (15–29) and Adults (30+) Expressing a Preference for Government
Employment if Pay and Work Conditions were Similar, 2011. Source: Gallup (2012).
Figure 5 Top 20 Countries in terms of Increases in Mean Years of Schooling, 1980–2010. Source:
Campante and Chor (2012) based on data from Barro and Lee (2010).
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education has been persistently low, as evidenced by performance on international tests.
As shown in Figure 6, the percentage of 8th graders performing at below the low bench-
mark in the TIMSS 2007 mathematics achievement tests in MENA is 54 percent, more
than twice the international median. Less than 20 percent of eighth graders in the region
perform at the “intermediate” benchmark or higher. Fifteen of the 49 countries that par-
ticipated in the eighth grade mathematics test had fewer than 50 percent of their students
attain the “low” benchmark. Of those fifteen countries, ten were Arab countries (SeeFigure 6 Distribution of TIMSS Eighth Grade Mathematics Score in 2007, Selected Arab Countries.
Source: Mullis et al. (2008).
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worse than that of Indonesia, and significantly worse than that of Thailand and Turkey.
Some of the worst performing countries are among the richest countries in the region,
with Qatar, for example, having 84 percent of its children performing under the “low”
threshold and Saudi Arabia with 82 percent performing below that level (Figure 6). Eight
grade students in both these countries performed worse than those in El-Salvador and
about the same as those in Ghana, a much poorer country and the worst performing non-
Arab country among the TIMSS 2007 participating countries. This suggests that the issue
is not lack of resources but the lack of incentives for children to perform well. With guar-
anteed jobs in the public sector waiting for them, there is no reason for children in these
rich countries to exert themselves. Another issue may be the nature of curricula in these
countries and the excessive focus on rote memorization.
The large increases in the quantity of education have not generally translated into im-
proved employment prospects for graduates. The frustration of young people who acquired
schooling but were not able to reap the requisite economic benefits from it is often cited as
one of the main causes of the Arab Spring uprisings (Campante and Chor 2012). To illus-
trate the dramatic change in employment prospects for secondary school and university
graduates over the past three decades, I use two unique data sets to trace the type of first
job they were able to obtain over time in both Egypt and Jordan3. As shown in Figure 7,
over 60 percent of those with secondary degrees or above in Egypt got jobs in the public
sector in the 1970s as compared to 20 percent who obtained formal private wage work. The
proportion getting public sector employment falls precipitously thereafter in Egypt to reach
under 20 percent for those entering in the first half of the 2000s. Nevertheless, the propor-
tion obtaining formal private sector work has hardly changed over the same period. The
slack has been taken up by informal private wage work and to a lesser extent unpaid work
in family-owned enterprises. There is therefore evidence that educated young people unable
to obtain public sector employment will eventually make their way to informal employment,
with the hope to eventually exit from it. However, as Assaad (2014, p. 18) demonstrates, byFigure 7 Employment Structure in the First Job by year of Entry into the Labor Market for those
who Attained an Upper Secondary Education or Above, Egypt and Jordan. Source: Assaad (2014)
based on data from ELMSP (2006) and JLMPS (2010).
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was no higher than what it was at entry. The resulting informalization of the labor market
for graduates in Egypt, which translates into an inability to join the ranks of the middle
class, undoubtedly accounts for much of the frustration that led to the January 25th Egyptian
revolution.
The experience of graduates over time in Jordan is similar in some respects but different
in others. The proportion of graduates obtaining public sector jobs in their first job also
fell dramatically in Jordan over time, but it started its decline much later than in Egypt,
around the late 1980s and early 1990s. It then fell rapidly, from about 60 percent to 30
percent, in just over a decade. Unlike Egypt, where the decline continued apace, the de-
cline in Jordan slowed dramatically in the 2000s and even reversed somewhat in recent
years. Also, in contrast to Egypt, where informality was the main alternative to public em-
ployment, formal private wage employment took up much of the slack in Jordan. A care-
ful examination of the data shows that Jordan was able to avoid informalization by
providing it private employers with greater flexibility in hiring and firing. The data show
that a growing proportion of these formal private sector jobs was in fact jobs with tempor-
ary contracts rather than in ones with indefinite duration contracts (Assaad 2013)4.
The labor market response to reduced public sector hiring in both countries – infor-
malization in the case of Egypt and the growth of formal but precarious temporary jobs
in the private sector in Jordan – describes quite well how male job seekers have
responded in the two countries. The main response among women in both instances
has been high unemployment rates at first and then withdrawal from the labor force
altogether and falling participation rates, an issue we discuss in more detail below. In-
formal employment simply poses too high a reputational risk and too much conflict
with their eventual roles as wives and mothers for most female job seekers in conserva-
tive Middle Eastern societies to constitute an acceptable alternative to public sector
employment (See Assaad, Hendy and Yassine 2014).4. Low and stagnant female labor force participation
The very low female labor force participation in the Arab World are amply documented (cf.
World Bank 2004b, World Bank 2013b). According to the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators, out of the twenty countries with the lowest female labor force participation
rates in 2011, fifteen were Arab countries (World Bank 2013c). Some have attributed these
low participation rates to the influence of conservative social norms and the value placed
on female modesty in Islam (Clark et al. 1991, Miles 2002, Sidani 2005, Spierings et al.
2009, Banyanpourtehrani and Sylvester 2013). Others attribute it to the effect of oil rents
on raising reservation wages, sustaining the patriarchal gender contract, or reducing de-
mand for female labor through the Dutch disease phenomenon (Karshenas and Moghadam
2001, Ross 2008). The main question I would like to address here is not why female labor
force participation rates are so low in the region, but rather why they have stagnated or in-
creased very little, despite significant increases in educational attainment and substantial
progress on closing the gender gap in education. This particular question has been referred
to as the MENA “gender equality paradox.” (World Bank 2013b).
A number of studies have established the strong relationship between labor force par-
ticipation and education in Arab countries (Assaad and El-Hamidi, 2009, Assaad, et al.
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educational attainment is strongly mediated by the availability of government employ-
ment for educated women. The slowdown in government hiring in recent years first re-
sulted in a drop in employment rates among women and a sharp increase in
unemployment, but later translated into declines in participation among educated
women in certain countries; a factor that has countered the decisive shift in favor of
greater educational attainment and that has kept overall participation rates flat.
This dynamic is clearly illustrated in Figure 8, which examines various forms of fe-
male participation in economic activity by level of educational attainment in Egypt,
Jordan and Tunisia over time. The first thing we note from the figure is that overall
participation was not only low, but also fairly stagnant over time in all three countries.
This was true despite the fact that, as we saw earlier, educational attainment rose rap-
idly and that participation rises significantly once women reach the post-secondary
level. In both Egypt and Jordan, labor force participation actually fell among educated
women in the 2000s5. In both countries, this decline can be traced through the fourFigure 8 Female Labor Force Participation, Employment-to-Population Ratio, Wage-Employment-to-
Population Ratio and Public employment-to-Population Ratio, by Educational Attainment and Over
Time for Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. Source: Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, 1998, 2006 and 2012.
Jordan, Department of Statistics, Employment and Unemployment Survey, 2000, 2006, 2007, 2010, and
Tunisia Institute of National Statistics, Labor Force Survey, 2005, 2008 and 2011.
Assaad IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 12 of 252014, 3:6
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/6figures to a decline in public wage employment for educated women, which comprises
the bulk of wage employment in both instances. Less educated women either partici-
pate exclusively in non-wage work (as in Egypt) or have very low participation rates (as
in Jordan).
The situation in Tunisia appears different, but in fact shares many of the same features
as in Egypt and Jordan. Although participation in the labor force increased over time for
women with higher education in Tunisia, this increase is entirely due to rising rates of un-
employment. The ratios of employment-to-population, wage employment-to-population,
and public wage employment all show the same declining trend that is apparent in Egypt
and Jordan. In all three countries, women with post-secondary education are strongly
dependent on the government for their employment. As rates of public employment de-
cline, their employment rates also decline, leading first to high unemployment rates
among women and then to falling labor force participation rates, as in the case of Egypt
and Jordan. Private wage employment was simply not a viable alternative to public sector
employment for these educated women, partly because women, who would have other-
wise spent their entire careers working in the public sector, either decline to take private
sector jobs altogether or leave such jobs at marriage. Thus, with the curtailment of em-
ployment in the government in recent years, women are either pushed in the unemploy-
ment queue, as we will see below, or pushed out of the labor force altogether.5. High youth unemployment: a product of labor market dualism?
High youth unemployment is probably the most distinctive feature of Arab labor mar-
kets. According to the ILO, the Middle East and North Africa, taken separately, are the
two regions with by far the highest rates of youth unemployment in the world (ILO
2013, Annex A). The youth unemployment rates in 2012 in the Middle East and North
Africa are estimated at 28.3 percent and 23.7 percent, respectively, compared to 18.1
percent in developed economies and the European Union, the region with the next
highest rate. Projecting forward, the ILO estimates that the youth unemployment rate
will keep rising to reach 30 percent in the Middle East by 2017 and to reach 24 percent
in North Africa by 2016, whereas the peak rate in any other world region will not ex-
ceed 18 percent, the projected rate for Central and South Eastern Europe over the
period 2013 to 2018. ILO estimates also show that the Middle East and North Africa
are the two regions with the highest gender gap in unemployment. The female-to-male
ratio in youth unemployment rates is estimated at 2.1 and 1.8 in the North Africa and
the Middle East, respectively, compared to 1.5 in Latin America and the Caribbean, the
region with the next highest ratio (Ibid.). The large discrepancy in unemployment rates
by sex is at the country level is clearly apparent in Figure 9. The only two countries
where female rates are slightly lower than males rates are Morocco and Lebanon; two
countries where the public sector does not play a major role in the labor market.
Not only is the Arab world distinguished by its high youth unemployment rates, but
also by the fact that they tend to rise with skill level. Figure 10 clearly shows the tendency
of youth unemployment rates to rise with educational attainment for both males and fe-
males. The main exceptions to this trend, among the countries shown, is the case of Pales-
tinians males and Syrian males and females. High unemployment among less educated
Palestinian males is a well-known phenomenon related to the closure of the Israeli labor
Most recent year (2007-2011). 
Figure 9 Youth Unemployment Rates inselected Arab Countries by Sex. Source: Author’s calculation
based on data from ILO (2011).
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ment is so high among less educated Syrian females. Outside these two exceptions, the
rising pattern of unemployment with educational attainment is unmistakable and is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that educated youth are queuing for public sector jobs.
To investigate this hypothesis further, I use microdata from a number of population
censuses in Arab countries for which data is available in the IPUMS-International data
base (Minnesota Population Center 2013). A formal test of the effects of the dualism
engendered by politically-motivated public sector employment policies on youth un-
employment is hard to devise because of the pervasiveness and enduring nature of
these policies. However, on the assumption that job search takes place for the most part
in the local jurisdiction in which the individual was born, we can devise a test based on
variations in the rate of public sector employment in different geographic jurisdictions
and its association with a youth’s probability of being unemployed. A queuing hypoth-
esis suggests that youth unemployment will be higher in jurisdictions with a higher
share of public employment, after controlling for age, education, sex, and other juris-


















































Figure 10 Youth (15–24) Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment and Sex for Selected
Arab Countries. Source: Author’s calculation based on data from ILO (2011). Note: Most recent
year, 2007–2011.
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unemployment in jurisdiction with higher than average government employment6. If
the assumption of mostly local job search is violated, the link between the structure of
the local labor market and queuing behavior could be severed, making the test unreli-
able. The violation of the mostly local job search assumption is more likely for males
than for females and for more educated workers than for less educated ones.
In all countries, I use the first level administrative geography (i.e. province or gover-
norate of birth) to define jurisdiction7. To avoid problems associated with the endo-
geneity of migration, I use the jurisdiction of birth rather than that of current residence
to estimate the relevant public employment rate. The sample consists of individual ob-
servations for youth 15–29 who are in the labor force from ten percent random sam-
ples of the population in seven population censuses from five countries, yielding a total
sample size of 2,084,702 observations8.
To motivate the analysis, I start by looking at scatter diagrams of youth unemployment
rates vs. the public employment rate at the province/governorate of birth (See Figure 11).
As shown in the figure, all but two samples exhibit the expected positive relationship. The
exceptions are Egypt in 1996 and Palestine in 2007. The negative relationship in Palestine
in 2007 is due to the fact that most unemployment in Palestine in that year had to do with
less educated male workers no longer being able to access the Israeli labor market for jobs
due to the security closure of the border between Israel and the West Bank.
Having looked at the bivariate relationship between youth unemployment and the local
public employment rate, I examine next the same relationship in a multivariate framework
where I control for a variety of other covariates at both the individual and community
levels. The individual level controls are age, sex, and educational attainment. The commu-
nity level controls are urban/rural location and some governorate/province characteristics,
such as prevalence of connections to basic urban services and variables indicating theFigure 11 Scatter Diagrams of Youth Unemployment Rates (Ages 15–29) vs the Proportion of
Employment in the Public Sector at the Governorate/Province Level in Selected Arab Countries.
Source: Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Minnesota Population Center (2013).
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planatory variables are shown in Table 1.
The youth (15–29) unemployment rates in each census by various characteristics are
shown in Table 2. As we have seen in Figure 10 above, unemployment rates for young
women are much higher than those of young men, except for Iraq. Unemployment
rates tend to be higher for more educated youth, except for Iraq and Palestine, where
they are highest for the least educated. In Egypt, peak youth unemployment rates are
reached at the secondary level, whereas in Jordan and Morocco they are reached at the
university level. There is no systematic pattern in youth unemployment by urban/rural


















Age 22.5 23.1 22.5 23.6 22.5 22.8 23.3 22.7
Age squared 519.3 547.5 521.7 570.1 520.9 532.4 558.1 532.1
Male (%) 80.1 79.3 91.6 74.2 69.1 89.7 85.0 78.9
Female (%) 19.9 20.7 8.4 25.8 30.9 10.3 15.0 21.1
Education: less than
primary (%)
39.6 27.1 31.3 7.0 57.8 10.8 5.2 36.1
Education: primary (%) 7.0 10.4 49.7 41.0 32.2 58.6 56.7 19.4
Education: secondary
(%)
44.2 46.4 13.7 35.4 8.0 23.7 19.9 34.3
Education: university
(%)




0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 100.0 14.8 5.7 19.2
Rural (%) 41.9 59.2 34.4 23.7 0.0 33.6 28.8 38.8





34.9 26.9 41.0 35.8 11.1 18.3 18.1 27.8
% Connected to
electricity
95.2 99.0 96.7 99.1 70.2 94.9 99.2 92.1
% Connected to piped
water
71.9 93.7 78.3 83.8 53.8 83.4 80.6 77.6
% Connected to
sewerage network








6.9 11.0 5.2 10.6 2.7 5.7 9.7 7.5
N (Observations) 679,333 839,128 233,428 67,750 218,806 27,239 19,018 2,084,702
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Minnesota Population Center (2013).
Note: Data excludes governorates/provinces above the 99th percentile of public employment rate.
















Male 23.4 18.7 22.0 27.9 22.7 19.5 22.2 21.5
Female 50.5 40.2 4.3 52.6 36.4 28.1 31.2 40.9
Education: Less
than Primary
3.7 10.1 25.7 20.4 20.3 25.3 25.4 12.6
Education: Primary 10.1 17.3 19.4 35.1 35.5 20.2 22.5 24.2
Education:
Secondary
53.4 29.3 14.6 35.2 37.6 18.9 22.6 38.3
Education:
University
32.5 31.6 15.6 36.2 39.5 19.8 27.2 31.3
Urban/rural missing 13.3 27.0 25.8 28.6 27.0
Rural 30.2 18.8 20.9 42.4 17.0 23.8 23.1
Urban 27.8 29.5 20.3 31.8 21.1 23.0 27.2
Total 28.8 23.2 20.5 34.3 27.0 20.4 23.5 25.6
N (Observations) 679,333 839,128 233,428 67,750 218,806 27,239 19,018 2,084,702
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Minnesota Population Center (2013).
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ditional on being in the labor force for youth 15–29 are shown in Table 3. I start by
running a regression for the pooled sample, with only main effects and country-year
dummies. I then add interactions between sex and education, the public employment
rate and education, the public employment rate and sex, and finally the public, employ-
ment rate, sex and education. In the subsequent columns I estimate regressions with
the same interaction terms for each of the country-year samples independently. The
reference individual in all the regressions is a 22 year-old male, with secondary educa-
tion, residing in a rural area in a governorate or province with mean characteristics for
the country in that year. The governorate/province characteristics, including the public
employment rate, are expressed in standardized units.
Focusing initially on the pooled main effects regression (shown in the first column of
Table 3), we note that the coefficient of the public employment rate is positive as ex-
pected but only significant at the 10 percent level once the individual and province-
level controls are included. An increase in the public employment rate of one standard
deviation is associated with a 2 percentage point increase in youth unemployment, on
average, across all seven censuses. We also note that age has the expected inverted
U-shaped effect on unemployment and that the reference young woman has an un-
employment rate that is 15 percentage points higher than the reference young man.
Education significantly increases unemployment up until the secondary level and then
the effect levels off.
Because the results for the model with interactions are a little more difficult to inter-
pret, I carry out simulations by varying the public employment rate from minus two
standard deviations to plus two standard deviations around the mean to see its effect
on the unemployment rate for different categories of youth by education and sex. The
results of these simulations are shown in Figure 12. For the regression pooling all coun-
tries, we can clearly see that the public employment rate in the governorate/province of
birth has a positive effect on the unemployment rate of young males and females with
less than secondary education, but has no significant effect on that of secondary and
Table 3 Marginal effects from a probit regression, all individuals Ages 15-29
Dependent variable: unemployed or not for those in labor force
All Main
Effects






Base Probability 0.396 0.387 0.561 0.244 0.196 0.320 0.391 0.190 0.244
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Table 3 Marginal effects from a probit regression, all individuals Ages 15-29 (Continued)
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Table 3 Marginal effects from a probit regression, all individuals Ages 15-29 (Continued)






























































679,333 0.320 839,128 0.149 233,428 0.077 67,750 0.151 218,806 0.072 27,239 0.082 19,018 0.062
Notes:
Statistical significance is marked by * at 5%, ** at 1% and *** at 0.1%.
Standard Errors clustered at Country-year-governorate/province level.
Governorates/provinces with a public employment rate above the 99th percentile are excluded from the sample.
Reference case: Male, Secondary, age 22 at mean for province/governorate characteristics.
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Figure 12 Youth Unemployment Rate by Share of Employment in the Public Sector in the Province/
Governorate of Birth, Simulations from Probit Regression. Source: Author’s calculations based on data
from Minnesota Population Center (2013).
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prising at first and seems to contradict our hypothesis that public employment policies
are likely to segment the labor market for the educated more than for the uneducated.
However, it could just be that the job search of educated youth has a broader geo-
graphic scope than that of uneducated youth and that they look for work well beyond
their governorate or province of birth. If that were the case, it would explain why edu-
cated youth have higher unemployment rates even in governorates with low rates of
public employment.
Moving now to the individual country results, we note that in Egypt in 1996, queuing
for public sector job tends to be most pronounced among university graduates and es-
pecially female graduates who have the strongest positive relationship between their
unemployment rate and the prevalence of public employment in the governorate of
birth. By 2006, this positive relationship appears to have disappeared for male graduates
and weakened significantly for female graduates.
Iraq in 1997 provides strong evidence in favor of the queuing hypothesis. It exhibits a
strong positive relationship between youth unemployment and the prevalence of public
employment in the province of birth for all educational and sex groups. For a one
standard deviation increase in the prevalence of public employment, the unemployment
rate of a reference Iraqi male youth with a university degree increases by 4 percentage
points, a relative increase of 18 percent. At 27 percent, the relative increase in un-
employment for female Iraqi graduates is also quite large although it is from a relatively
low base.
In Jordan in 2004, there is direct evidence of queuing for males with less than pri-
mary education and for females with less than university education. Females with uni-
versity education there have very high unemployment predicted unemployment rates in
excess of 80 percent and could very well be queuing for public jobs in the national
labor market. In Morocco in 2004, there is a positive relationship between the youth
unemployment rate and the prevalence of public jobs in the province, for all groups ex-
cept for male university graduates. Again, given their high unemployment rates, the ab-
sence of a positive relationship for this group does not mean that they do not queue
for public jobs, but that their job search is probably not limited to their province of
birth.
The Palestinian case is interesting because of the strong reversal that occurs between
1997, when the Israeli labor market was still fairly open for less educated makes, and
2007, when the security-related closure made strongly affected the employment pros-
pects of this group. In 1997, there is a strong positive relationship between youth un-
employment and the prevalence of public employment for all educational groups and
for both sexes. This was a time that the Palestinian authority was building up its ranks
and when it was probably still worthwhile for young people to queue for government
jobs. By 2007 when the labor market situation became much less favorable, the only
group that appears to be queuing in any significant fashion is female university gradu-
ates who have few employment prospects outside the public sector.
To summarize the results of the multivariate analysis, we can say the following.
Youth unemployment has a positive relationship with the local rate of government em-
ployment for youth with less than secondary education of both sexes in the pooled
sample and in four of the seven country-year samples. The exceptions are Egypt 1996
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ship, and Palestine 2007, where unemployment was more likely to be driven by the ef-
fects of the closure of the border with Israel than by queuing for government
employment. Although government employment is rare for people with less than sec-
ondary education, this group is the most likely to restrict its job search to the local area
and therefore to be affected by local public employment rates. For youth educated at
the secondary level, there is a positive relationship with local government employment
rates for both sexes in Iraq, Morocco, and Palestine 1997, and for women in Jordan.
For those educated at the university level, there is a positive relationship for both sexes
in Egypt 1996, Palestine 1997, and for women in the pooled sample, Egypt 2006,
Morocco and Palestine 2007. It is not surprising that the evidence in favor of queuing
for government jobs is stronger for educated women since they are likely to be more
geographically constrained in their job search and their behavior would therefore more
likely be governed by local conditions than their male counterparts who would prob-
ably have a more national job search strategy. On the whole, there is ample evidence of
youth unemployment being associated with queuing for government jobs, with the evi-
dence being admittedly weaker for groups for whom our test is least likely to be valid.6. Conclusion
I argue in this paper that the longstanding practice of providing public sector employ-
ment at higher than market-clearing compensation as a tool of political appeasement
has not only led to the misallocation of human capital in Arab economies, but also to
the wrong kinds of human capital investments, and inefficient queuing by educated
workers for government jobs. The consequences of these disastrous policies persist well
after the policies themselves have been suspended and continue to shape labor markets
in the long term. They include the large overhang of excess employment in the public
sector, the existence of large stocks of inappropriate human capital, one of the longest
lived assets in the economy, continued institutional distortions in education systems,
which continue to be oriented toward credentialism rather than skill formation, and
distorted expectations among young job seekers that lead to queuing for public sector
jobs and high youth unemployment. Female job seekers are more affected by this kind
of labor market dualism because of the more limited opportunities they face in the pri-
vate sector, the bigger wedge they face between their market clearing wage and their
potential compensation in the public sector, and their reluctance to take up informal
employment that could threaten their sexual and reputational safety. As such they face
higher unemployment rates and, more recently, increasing discouragement from par-
ticipating in the workforce altogether.
I also argue that the erosion of the authoritarian bargain social contract was done in
such a way as to protect the gains and entitlements of regime insiders and incumbents.
This means that the entire cost of adjustment was shifted onto the younger generations
who had come to expect the same benefits that their older counterparts received upon
acquiring education. Instead they found themselves shut out of government jobs and
relegated to low quality jobs in the informal economy. The failure of the Arab econ-
omies to develop dynamic, competitive private sectors that are integrated into world
markets can itself be attributed to the rentier nature of these economies. The
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schooling but obtained few valuable labor market skills and even fewer economic op-
portunities, have clearly contributed to the Arab Spring uprisings in the countries
whose regimes could no longer afford the authoritarian bargain. For now, the oil rich
monarchies are able to continue to buy political stability with generous welfare pay-
ments and lucrative jobs in the public sector for their citizens, but the limits of this ap-
proach will undoubtedly become clear by the time of the next downturn in oil prices.
At that point the social and political costs of highly segmented labor markets will be-
come wholly apparent.
I acknowledge that the evidence I provided to support my arguments about the im-
pact of the region’s political economy on labor market and human capital outcomes, al-
though compelling, is mostly circumstantial. A formal statistical test of the effects of
such an enduring and pervasive practice as the use of public sector employment as a
tool for political appeasement is hard to come by. My attempt at a formal test of the
hypothesis that queuing for government jobs explains high youth unemployment rates
does provide support for the hypothesis but also suffers from some obvious limitations.
Because the test depends on local variation in the availability of government jobs to
drive differences in local youth unemployment rates, it relies on the assumption that
youth job search behavior is mostly limited to local labor markets. While that may be
true for the most part for some youth, such as young women and possibly lesser edu-
cated young men, it is not likely to be true for more educated men, who probably
search for jobs in a national, if not international, labor market. Thus the absence of a
positive association between high local rates of public employment and unemployment
for these groups does not mean that queuing for government jobs is not taking place at
a broader scale.Endnotes
1The analysis in this section draws on Assaad (1997).
2Using data from 1988, Assaad (1999) estimates that non-wage aspects of employ-
ment in the Egyptian public sector are worth at least as much as the wage itself.
3The data is obtained from the Egypt Labor Market Survey of 2006 (ELMPS 2006)
and the Jordan Labor Market Survey of 2010 (JLMPS 2010). The surveys inquire about
the timing of first labor market entry and the type of job obtained at that time for indi-
viduals in various cohorts.
4Egypt implemented labor law reforms that allowed employers issue indefinite dur-
ation contracts that could be renewed an indefinite number of times only in 2004.
These reforms would therefore not be reflected in this data, which ends in 2005.
5Because of a change in sampling frame, there is a break in the Jordanian data be-
tween the last quarter of 2006 and the first quarter of 2007, which resulted in an artifi-
cial increase in female participation rates. Because of that, it is best to compare 2000 to
2006 and 2007 to 2010. See Assaad et al. (2013) for further discussion of this issue.
6It is possible that causality is in the reverse direction and that government place
more jobs in high unemployment areas. This would be the case, for instance, if public
works programs were creating a lot of temporary public jobs in depressed areas. There
are few such programs in the countries we are studying and most government jobs tend
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linked to how depressed a region is.
7There were 27 such jurisdictions in 1996 and 29 in 2006 in Egypt, 15 in 1997 in Iraq,
12 in 2004 in Jordan, 60 in 2004 in Morocco, and 16 in 1997 and 11 in 2007 in
Palestine. The difference between the number of jurisdictions in Palestine in 1997 and
2007 was due to the fact that Gaza was not covered in the 2007 Palestinian Census due
to political and security considerations.
8I trim the sample to exclude governorates/provinces with a public employment rate
that is larger than the 99th percentile to avoid the undue influence of small province
with very high public employment rates.
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